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THE TURKS OF BULGARIA: AN OUTLIER CASE OF FORCED MIGRATION 
AND VOLUNTARY RETURN  
 
Muzaffer Kutlay* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The Turks of Bulgaria have a particular place in displacement scholarship. As the largest 
minority population in the country, they were subjected to ethnic cleansing in the 1980s. 
The anti-Turkish sentiments culminated into state-led systematic exclusion and more than 
340,000 Turks were forcefully migrated to Turkey in 1989. After the collapse of 
Communism and transition to democracy, almost 40 per cent of them voluntarily returned 
to Bulgaria that makes it an outlier case in displacement literature. Drawing on forty-six 
semi-structured interviews, this study contributes to the literature by offering a grounded 
conceptual framework that explains the macro-dynamics of voluntary and sustainable 
return through an in-depth study of Bulgarian case. The findings suggest that three-
factors account for the voluntary return: (i) the peaceful transition to inclusive democracy 
and power sharing; (ii) the dual moderation between majority and minority 
representatives; and (iii) the enabling role of international actors, primarily the EU-
anchor. 
 
Key words: Turks of Bulgaria, assimilation, forced migration, displacement, voluntary 
return. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on the macro-dynamics of forced migration of the Turks of Bulgaria 
and their voluntary return in the aftermath RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V WUDQVLWLRQ WR GHPRFUDF\
Despite being subjected to assimilation policies and forced to leave the country during 
the final phases of the Communist regime in 1980s, the significant number of voluntary 
returnees make the Turks of Bulgaria an outlier case in displacement scholarship.1 As 
being the indigenous community and largest minority population in the country, they 
were often seen as a potential µGHVWDELOLVLQJ¶ IDFWRU2 and Bulgarian Communist Party 
(hereinafter, BCP) leaders tried hard to overlook their existence either by manipulating or 
suppressing census data or refuting their ethnic identity. The anti-Turkish sentiments 
culminated into state-led systematic assimilation and ethnic cleansing policy in the 1980s 
²notoriously called ³QDWLRQDO UHYLYDO SURFHVV´² and ultimately, over 340,000 Turks 
were forced to migrate to Turkey in the summer of 1989. After the collapse of the 
Communist regime and transition to democracy, almost 40 per cent (according to 
registered numbers 133,272) of them voluntarily returned to Bulgaria (Konukman, 1990: 
61, 71).  
The large number of returnees and their peaceful coexistence with the Bulgarian 
majority make the Turks of Bulgaria a crucial case in the displacement literature. 
According to Eckstein (1975: 79-DFDVHFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGFUXFLDO LI LW LV µPRVW
OLNHO\¶ RU µOHDVW OLNHO\¶ FRQFHUQLQJ WKH YHULILFDWLRQ RI WKHRUHWLFDO SURSRVLWLRQV 7Ke 
experiences of ethnic cleansing and forced migration, peaceful transformation and 
voluntary return of the Turks make Bulgaria an example of a µOHDVWOLNHO\¶FDVHEHFDXVH
of its background conditions. In the 1980s, there was vast human suffering marked by an 
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systematic assimilation policy including forced name-changing, imprisonments, internal 
displacements, and finally cross-border forced migration. Yet these repressive measures 
did not pave the way for a deep-seated protracted conflict between the Bulgarian majority 
and the Turkish minority. On the contrary, almost 40 per cent of migrated Turks 
voluntarily returned to their homes ²and more importantly² re-integrated into the 
couQWU\¶VSROLWLFDO-economic system. It is also puzzling given the fact that Turkey, the kin 
state of the Turks in Bulgaria, provided accommodation and financial support to the 
forced migrants during their initial phase of resettlement in Turkey, ensuring suitable 
conditions and additional motivation not to return to Bulgaria.  
The main finding and argument of this article is that voluntary and sustainable 
return to Bulgaria became possible due to the simultaneous existence and mutually 
inclusive interaction of three sets of macro-dynamics at the domestic-international nexus: 
(i) regime change and the transition to democracy that underpinned the creation of 
LQFOXVLYHSROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV LQ%XOJDULD LL µGRXEOHPRGHUDWLRQ¶RI WKHPDMRULW\ DQG
minority leaders that represented the Bulgarian and Turkish sides, and (iii) the enabling 
and complementary role of international actors, particularly the role of EU-anchor. To 
substantiate the main argument, section 2 sketches out the current literature and states the 
main research question of the article. Section 3 discusses the methodological approach 
pursued. Sections 4 and 5 provide a basic overview of the Turks of Bulgaria and discuss 
the empirical findings with reference to the conceptual framework adopted in this article. 
The final section extrapolates some lessons for the broader literature.  
 
 4 
 
LITERATURE AND MAIN QUESTION 
The Bulgarian case is striking from a conceptual viewpoint, as it poses a solid counter-
example to the mainstream theories of democratization and ethnic conflict that suggest a 
different pattern in terms of minority-majority relations. For instance, Mann (2005) 
argues that democratization is frequently associated with ethnic conflict escalation. He 
FODLPV ³HWKQLF FOHDQVLQJ LV WKHGDUN VLGHRIGHPRFUDF\´ DV ³UHJLPHVQHZO\ HPEDUNHG
upon democratization are more likely to commit murderous ethnic cleansing than are 
VWDEOH DXWKRULWDULDQ UHJLPHV´ 0DQQ   0DQQ¶V WKHRU\ LV QRW VXSSRUWHG LQ WKH
Bulgarian case since democratization correlated with the improvement of inter-ethnic 
relations between the Turkish minority and the Bulgarian majority. The Bulgarian case 
DOVR FKDOOHQJHV %UXEDNHU¶V (1996:  ³WKHRU\ RI WULDGLF UHODWLRQVKLSV´ $FFRUGLQJ WR
Brubaker (1996), the unstable and exploitative nature of the relationship between national 
minorities, nationalising states, and external national homelands invite conflict potential. 
This, however, did not turn out to be the case in Bulgarian example. Mansfield and 
Snyder (2007), similarly, propose that emerging democracies with weak political 
institutions are more likely to adopt aggressive policies as their leaders attempt to 
mobilise domestic support by invoking external threats and adopting exclusionary 
nationalist rhetoric. This was not the case in Bulgaria either, as Turkey showed no 
interest at all in playing external national homeland through military threat or militant 
nationalism and the Bulgarian political elite also acted very carefully in order not to 
invoke nationalist rhetoric. The Bulgarian case, therefore, is a telling example for broader 
literature to account for the macro-dynamics, which explain the peaceful transition and 
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durable return of the displaced people.3 Through an in-depth analysis of the Bulgarian 
case, this article aims to contribute to the relevant body of the literature that explores the 
underlying conditions.4  
Several studies in the existing literature extend our knowledge on the state of the 
Turks in Bulgaria and the ways in which they are acculturated in Bulgarian society. One 
strand of research deals with the micro-level analysis that is based on extensive 
ethnographic fieldwork. These studies explore the dynamics of border activities between 
Bulgaria and Turkey (Parla, 2009), the diverging identity perceptions of Turks who 
immigrated from Bulgaria and the imminent challenges they encounter (Parla 2006), and 
the dynamics of irregular migration between Turkey and Bulgaria during 1990s (Parla, 
2007). Another striking strand of research, drawing on psychological perspectives, deals 
with the degree of socio-political integration of Turkish minority in Bulgaria (Dimitrova 
et. al, 2015). For instance, Radosveta Dimitrova and co-authors provide a very rich 
comparative account of the acculturation processes of the Turks in Bulgaria (Dimitrova 
et. al, 2014a) along with other ethnic minorities, primarily Roma people with respect to 
the ways in which they form their collective identity (Dimitrova, 2013; Dimitrova 
2014c). $FFRUGLQJO\ WKH DXWKRUV IRXQG WKDW ³for the Turkish-Bulgarians, adoption and 
adjustment to the mainstream [Bulgarian] culture are more important possibly due to 
KLVWRULFDO H[SHULHQFHV DQG VSHFLILF VWDWXV´ 'LPLWURYD HW DO a: 84), though 
references to causality in terms of historic experiences are not empirically substantiated. 
7KH PDLQ UHDVRQ DSSHDUV WR EH WKH ³FRQWH[W´ ZKLFK LQIRUPHG WKHLU ³DFFXOWXUDWLRQ
H[SHULHQFHV´VXFKDVUHSUHVVLRQDVVLPLODWLRQFDPSDLJQVDQG the severe oppression they 
encountered (Dimitrova et. al, 2014a: 78). In another important study on Turkish youth in 
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Bulgaria, Dimitrova et. al (2014b: 358) indicated that ³Turkish-Bulgarian´ youth 
identified with their ethnic origin strongly by holding a complex collective identity that 
LQFOXGHV³DQLQWHJUDWLRQRIHWKQLFTurkish, familial, and religious but not their Bulgarian 
PDLQVWUHDP LGHQWLW\´ In their comparative research on ³Turkish-Bulgarians´ and 
³Turkish-Germans´, Aydinli-Karakulak and Dimitrova (2015) demonstrated that a 
contextually differentiated view is requiUHG WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH G\QDPLFV RI ³KHDOWK\´
identity formation among immigrants. They found that the endorsement of national 
identity was not adaptive in an assimilative acculturation context, as it was the case in 
³Turkish-Bulgarians´ (also see Dimitrova and Aydinli-Karakulak, 2016).5 
The current research on the micro-dynamics of integration and acculturation sheds 
light on the evolution of Turkish minority identity in Bulgaria. The macro-dynamics of 
peaceful transition and the voluntary return of the Turks, however, are still understudied 
themes in the literature. Despite the fact that several factors inform the peaceful 
coexistence and imminent tensions between minority and majority populations in 
Bulgaria, a vital question remains unanswered in the first instance: How did it become 
possible to ensure peaceful transition and sustainable voluntary return to Bulgaria, even 
though the Turkish minority in Bulgaria were subject to systematic oppression and 
persistent discrimination during the final phases of Communist regime? By addressing 
the main research question sketched out above, the premise of this article is to contribute 
to this particular strand of the literature by primarily driving on field research findings 
and offering a macro-level grounded conceptual framework.  
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METHODOLOGY 
This article relies on process tracing to address the main research question. According to 
*HRUJH DQG %HQQHWW   SURFHVV WUDFLQJ ³LGHQWLILHV WKH LQWHUYHQLQJ FDXVDO
process ²the causal chain and causal mechanism² between independent variable[s] and 
WKH RXWFRPH RI WKH GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH´ 3rocess tracing enables researchers to assess 
whether the hypothesized outcome occurs in the sequence and particular causation 
claimed by the conceptual framework (Hall, 2013). To this end, three types of interview 
data along with ample primary and secondary sources inform this study. First, forty-six 
semi-structured interviews were conducted including political elites of Bulgarian and 
Turkish communities (Lilleker, 2003: 208). Purposive sampling was utilised to unravel 
and reflect the views of the main actors who were directly involved in the design and 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHVRFDOOHGµQDWLRQDOUHYLYDOSURFHVV¶DQGleading representatives of 
the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (Vromen, 2010: 259). 6 Second, I interviewed families 
subjected to assimilation and forced migration that subsequently returned to Bulgaria 
following the collapse of Communist regime to complement elite-level data with the 
perspectives of ordinary people.7 Finally, third-party observers and opinion leaders were 
also interviewed to gather more information about majority-minority relations and the 
inner workings of the transformations that took place in Bulgaria. The interviewee 
sample thus consists of three categories that reflect different perspectives: (i) 
representatives of main political parties and high-level bureaucrats ±including EU 
officials- in Bulgaria, (ii) representatives of the Turkish minority and the victims of 
assimilation policy and forced migration, and (iii) informed third party observers who 
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closely follow the process in Bulgaria. The overarching rationale for conducting semi-
structured in-depth elite interviews is to understand how elites on both sides frame the 
transition period and lead ordinary minority/majority members. Furthermore, ordinary 
minority members were also interviewed to supplement the elite-level findings.8 Each 
interview comprised of 8 semi-structured open-ended questions. The interviews were 
conducted in Turkish, English, and Bulgarian.9  
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) suggest that the analysis and replication of 
semi-structured interviews is a challenging task for researchers due to open-ended nature 
RIWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶UHVSRQVHVIn this article, following Halperin and Heath (2012: 278), 
the interview data is analysed in three steps. After reducing the data in field notes and 
transcriptions, the interview material was ³DVVLJQed to different categories according to 
WKHYDULDEOH WRZKLFK WKH\ UHODWH´ +DOSHULQ DQG+HDWK8VLQJ the research 
questions and hypotheses as a guide, three broader categories were assigned. First, the 
data is categorized according to the macro-dynamics that enabled peaceful transformation 
and voluntary return. Second step was to understand why and how these factors counted. 
Thus, based on the conceptual framework, the interview data is classified in three sub-
categories according to the criteria of how interviewees perceived (i) regime change in 
Bulgaria, (ii) the roles of political leaders on the majority and minority communities 
during transition period, and (iii) the function of external anchors, particularly the EU, 
involved in the process. Third, after analysing the data and crosschecking their validity 
through triangulation,10 general conclusions were drawn whether, why, and how peaceful 
transformation and voluntary return became possible in Bulgarian case. As Silverman 
(2011) underlines, however, interviews do not provide direct access to the facts and 
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realities but enable researchers to have first-hand information about how interviewees 
have perceived the events. The reliability and validity of the information they provided 
needs to be crosschecked and substantiated with other sources of data (Dale, 2006: 81). In 
this context, this article draws on Bulgarian archival documents, newspaper sources, and 
country reports of the European Council, Helsinki Watch, and European Commission as 
well as the relevant academic literature.  
 
DISPLACEMENT OF THE TURKS: AN OVERVIEW  
The Turks of Bulgaria are the largest minority group in the country with a population of 
588,318 out of 7.4 million according to the 2011 census figures. The demographic 
composition of the country has changed substantially throughout the history of modern 
Bulgaria. Prior to the unprecedented exodus of 1989, there were five other migration 
waves starting in the early 1900s, which clearly show that the Bulgarian state attempted 
to keep Turkish minority unGHU SROLWLFDO FRQWURO VLQFH WKH FRXQWU\¶V LQGHSHQGHQFH
especially in the post-1945 period. As Bates documents (1994) %XOJDULD¶V RIILFLDO
policies toward the Turks varied significantly during the Cold War. In the initial phase of 
the Communist regime, the approach toward the Turkish minority was conciliatory and 
inclusionary (Warhola and Boteva, 2003: 260-264). They were granted special rights 
especially with respect to education, religious affairs and media freedom. The tolerant 
approach, however, started to change gradually during the 1960s especially after Todor 
Zhivkov assumed the leadership of the BCP on 4 March 1954, where he remained in 
power for 35 years. The Zhivkov and his close aides VRXJKW WR FUHDWH D ³KRPRJHQRXV
%XOJDULDQ VWDWH´ WKURXJK YDULRXV measures (Kalinova, 2014). The repression of ethnic 
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minorities became systematic and first targeted Muslim Pomaks during the 1960s (Parla, 
,QDQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQUHSODFHGWKHSUHYLRXV³'LPLWURY&RQVWLWXWLRQ´RI
1947, which had been in fact tolerant towards PLQRULWLHV DV WKH H[LVWHQFH RI ³QDWLRQDO
PLQRULWLHV´ZDVH[SOLFLWO\VWDWHG7KHDUWLFOHLQSDUWLFXODUUHDGs as follows:  
 
 ³7KH FLWL]HQV KDYH WKH ULJKW IRU HGXFDWLRQ 7KH HGXFDWLRQ LV VHFXODU ZLWK
democratic and progressive spirit. National minorities have the right to learn their 
mother tongue and to develop their national culture as the learning of Bulgarian 
ODQJXDJHLVREOLJDWRU\´11  
 
The 1971 Constitution, however, was a turning point in majority-minority 
relations under the auspices of the Zhivkov UHJLPHEHFDXVHWKHWHUP³QDWLRQDOPLQRULWLHV´
ZDVUHSODFHGZLWK³WKHFLWL]HQVRIQRQ-%XOJDULDQRULJLQ´Following the turbulent 1970s, 
the exclusionary policies of the regime reached its climax in the winter of 1984-1985 
ZLWK =KLYNRY¶V announcement of the so-called ³QDWLRQDO UHYLYDO SURFHVV´ vazroditelen 
protses ZKLFK ZDV LQ IDFW ³DQ DVVLPLODWLRQ DQG HWKQLF FOHDQVLQJ SROLF\´ DV
retrospectively accepted and condemned by the Bulgarian National Parliament in 2012.12  
One of the turning points of the assimilation policy was to forcibly slavicize the 
names of the Turks in the country. The name-changing policy targeted approximately 
over one million people, most of whom were ethnic Turks. 13  Based on official 
documents, eyewitness accounts and victim testimonies, Helsinki Watch Committee 
reports (1986, 1987) documented that hundreds of people were killed and imprisoned on 
the grounds that they resisted to the involuntary change of their original Turkish names. 
According to other sources, 517 people were arrested and sent to Belene camp in addition 
to 400 people who were exiled or imprisoned during the winter of 1984-85 without any 
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prior legal judgement. 14  In December 1984, several people were killed during the 
peaceful mass protests against the forced name-changing policy in Killi (Benkovski) and 
Kayaloba, the villages of Kirkovo in Kardzhali region, where the majority of Turks were 
living. 
In fact, the policy was far beyond a mere name-changing attempt.15 As <DOÕPRY
VWDWHG³QDWLRQDOUHYLYDOGRHVQRWRQO\UHIHUWRWKHFKDQJHLQQDPHVEXWDOVRUHIHUVWRWKH
assimilation of ethnic, religious, and cultural identity of the Turks of Bulgaria by using 
IRUFH´ 16  The archival evidence also suggests that the Bulgarization campaign was 
officially adopted by the BCP Politburo, and implemented as part of a comprehensive set 
of measures.17 Accordingly, all kinds of public communication in Turkish language were 
denied. Those in violation of the ban were levied heavy fines. Associations, newspapers 
and FXOWXUDODQGPXVLFDODFWLYLWLHVUHODWHGWRµ7XUNV¶DQGµ7XUNLVKQHVV¶ZHUHDOVRbanned. 
Similarly, Islamic holidays were cancelled and religious freedom was set aside to the 
extent that Turks were not allowed to wear their traditional trouser ³úDOYDU´LQSXEOLF18 
The assimilation policy was also designed as an intimidation to other minority groups, as 
the Turks were compelled to write their new Slavic-Bulgarian names on the gates of their 
houses. The homogenization policies were as widespread and methodical to the extent 
that the civil servants even erased the Turkish names on the tombstones (Ataöv, 1990: 2). 
The name-changing policy was carried out systematically with an ultimate aim to deny 
the existence of the Turks of Bulgaria.19  
The Turkish minority launched waves of peaceful protests that included hunger 
strikes, daily letters to state institutions, and mass demonstrations in early 1989 to resist 
the assimilation policy and to restore their rights. In May 1989, the protests intensified 
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and people gathered in the city centres so as to attract the attention of the international 
community. Their goal was to call on the Bulgarian government to protect fundamental 
rights and freedoms of Turks as well as to put an end to the constantly expanding 
VDQFWLRQVDQGLQWHUQDOGLVSODFHPHQWV'D\ÕR÷OX-347). It soon became apparent 
that the protests were falling on deaf ears, as the counter-policy of Zhivkov was very 
harsh. On 29 May 1989, Zhivkov announced on Bulgarian National Television and 
%XOJDULDQ 1DWLRQDO 5DGLR WKDW ERUGHUV ³ZHUH QRZ RSHQ DQG DQ\RQH FRXOG OHDYH
%XOJDULD´20 The Ministry of Internal Affairs prepared and distributed special application 
forms for international passports among Turkish people that settled the administrative 
infrastructure of forced migration (Bakalova, 2006: 235). The mass deportation of Turks, 
which began in mid-1989, resulted in the migration of more than 340,000 people to 
Turkey by the end of August, for many, after leaving all their properties and belongings 
on the Bulgarian side of the border.21 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF VOLUNTARY RETURN OF THE TURKS 
The domestic and international dynamics during the 1990s dramatically changed the 
nature of majority-minority relations in Bulgaria. First and foremost, over one-third of 
displaced Turks returned to Bulgaria on a voluntary basis. The voluntary return endured 
sustainably because, even after tortuous legal processes, these people restored their rights 
DQGEHFDPHLQWHJUDOSDUWVRI%XOJDULD¶VHFRQomic, political and social life. Based on field 
research findings in Bulgaria, in this part, I shall propose a grounded framework that 
three sets of interrelated macro-dynamics stand out as the main causes of feasible and 
sustainable return. 
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Peaceful transition to democracy and institutional design 
7KH ILUVW VHW RI IDFWRUV LV UHODWHG WR %XOJDULD¶V SHDFHIXO WUDQVLWLRQ Wo democracy in the 
immediate aftermath of the collapse of Communist regime. Todov Zhivkov was 
dethroned on 10 NovemEHUZLWKD³SDODFHFRXS´designed and undertaken within 
the higher echelons of the BCP (Baeva, 2004: 297-325; Crampton, 1997: 216). The 
dethronement of Zhivkov marked a tipping-point not only in Bulgarian politics but also 
for the trajectory of Turkish minority in the country.  
Zhivkov was ousted due to three main reasons. First, the crises of the Communist 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe at the time unsurprisingly hit the shores of the 
Bulgarian political system as well. Accordingly, the BCP rulers found themselves in a 
delicate position concerning the transformation of the political system. As demands for 
political liberalization intensified, different opposition factions emerged around the 
country and inside the BCP. The rising domestic opposition as well as the changing 
international atmosphere triggered by popular revolts against totalitarian regimes 
including BuOJDULD¶V QHLJKERXU 5RPDQLD IRUFHG the BCP elite to implement certain 
reforms. The first step in this direction was the removal of Todor Zhivkov. Civil society 
opposition intensified as fourteen non-communist groups formed a political platform in 
November 1989 to promote political pluralism in Bulgaria. The non-communist groups 
formed the Union of Democratic Forces (hereinafter, UDF) and elected Zhelyu Zhelev as 
their leader who subsequently became the first democratically elected President of 
Bulgaria.22 The UDF became a very influential platform that promoted democratization 
and non-violent transformation in the country. 
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Second, the worsening economic conditions in Bulgaria accelerated the end of 
Zhivkov regime. The Bulgarian economy was plunged into structural difficulties starting 
from the second half of the 1980s. Volatility in growth and export figures, especially 
rising inflation after 1988, and worsening living conditions aroused the anger of masses 
against the BCP (Crampton, 1997: 217). On top of that, the economy encountered a 
severe production crisis due to the forced migration of the Turks as they were mainly 
employed in agricultural sector and their exodus contributed to poor harvests, which in 
turn, led to the extension of food rationing from rural areas to the provinces of Sofia.23 
After the removal of Zhivkov, it became apparent that economic performance indicators 
ZHUHLQIDFWZRUVHWKDQWKHUHJLPH¶VIDEULFDWHGQXPEHUV7KHIRUHLJQGHEWRIWKHFRXQWU\
IRULQVWDQFHVWRRGQRW³DWELOOLRQGROODUVDGPLWWHGE\=KLYNRYEXWDWELOOLRQGROODUV´
(Crampton, 1997: 217).  
Third, the so-FDOOHG µQDWLRQDO UHYLYDO¶ SROLFLHV RI =KLYNRY UHJLPH DQG WKH PDVV
exodus of the Turkish minority sparked a debate within the country and across 
international platforms, which in turn, created a boomerang effect against Zhivkov. 
Beginning in mid-December 1989, the Turkish minority organized a series of protests for 
WKH UHVWRUDWLRQ RI WKHLU RULJLQDO 7XUNLVK QDPHV ,Q WKLV UHJDUG WKH ³VLOHQW SUHVHQFH´
protest in front of the Parliament on 28 December 1989 constituted a watershed moment 
'D\ÕR÷OX   The official policy change of the BCP was publicised with 
$OH[DQGHU /LORY¶V UHSRUW D PHPEHU RI WKH ILUVW HFKHORQ SDUW\ IDFWLRQ ZKLFK RSHQO\
denounced the policies of Zhivkov. The report, entitled To Overcome the Distortions 
among the Turkish-Speaking and Muslim Population in Bulgaria DFFHSWHG WKH 7XUNV¶
rights to exercise all of their religious and ethnic rights provided by the original 
 15 
Constitution (Dimitrov, 2000). Bakalova (2006: 236) argues that this paradigmatic 
cKDQJH PLJKW DOVR EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV D ³SHUIHFW KDQG-ZDVKLQJ PDQRHXYUH´ EHFDXVH E\
doing so the ruling Communist Party elites SURPRWHG WKH LGHD WKDW ³QDWLRQDO UHYLYDO
SURFHVV´ZDVQRWLQIDFWDSDUW\SROLF\DQGWKHZKROHSDUW\FRXOGQRWEHKHOGUHVSRQVLEOH
for the mistakes of the Zhivkov era.24 Lilov, in his report, also underlined the increasing 
international criticisms in the sense that it was by no means possible for the ruling elite to 
justify the assimilation policy and convince the international community about the mass 
exodus of the Turkish minority. In this context, policy change turned into a necessity, 
rather than a choice, to avoid the isolation of Bulgaria in its international relations 
(Poulton, 1993: 163). Accordingly, a name-restoration policy was officially declared, 
which readmitted the rights of the Turks to freely choose their names, conduct their 
UHOLJLRXVDIIDLUVDQGOHDUQWKHLUQDWLYHODQJXDJH'D\ÕR÷OX 
7KH %XOJDULDQ VWDWH¶V UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ SROLFLHV ZHUH HYLGHQW LQ D VHULHV RI public 
apologies and acknowledgements RI FULPHV FRPPLWWHG GXULQJ WKH ³national revival 
SURFHVV´,QWKHHDUO\WUDQVLWLRQSHULRGLWZDVQRWSRVVLEOHIRU%XOJDULDQUXOLQJHOLWHVWR 
officially apologise due to the strong domestic opposition and audience costs. Despite the 
fact that Communism was denounced by the masses, the nationalist sentiments that 
strongly opposed to restoration of WKH 7XUNV¶ minority rights were still sufficiently 
evident to force Bulgarian officials to act in a cautious manner.25 On that note, it was only 
after the second half of the 1990s that the Bulgarian officials apologised to the Turkish 
minority on different occasions. Inter alia, then Bulgarian President Peter Stoyanov 
apologised to the Turks in his speech at Turkish Parliament in Ankara in 1997 and more 
recently, in 2012, the Bulgarian Parliament signed a historical declaration that defined the 
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assimilation process as ³HWKQLF FOHDQVLQJ´ and officially condemned the 1989 forced 
migration (Kutlay, 2012). Interview data suggest that in addition to the quick restoration 
of the rights of Turkish minority, the subsequent public apologies and the official 
acknowledgement of crimes committed against the Turkish minority boosted the sense of 
security for the returnees. The interviewees, especially, hailed the latter point as 75 per 
cent of them responded that the state apology and acknowledgement of crimes had a very 
positive impact on majority-minority relations in Bulgaria. 
 
 
The importance of double moderation 
The second set of factors that informed peaceful transition in Bulgaria and the voluntary 
return of the Turks in the aftermath RI=KLYNRY¶V regime LV WKH µGRXEOHPRGHUDWLRQ¶RI
majority and minority leaders. The literature suggests that the policies and actions of 
political leaders are among major causes of conflicts (Korostelina, 2009). Accordingly, 
leaders play a vital role in mobilizing social movements, dividing groups, and increasing 
mistrust among them. Political leaders can be crucial catalysts to start and stop the use of 
organized political violence. The interview data suggest that, from a political 
entrepreneurship point of view, conciliatory leadership on the side of Bulgarian policy-
makers and Turkish minority feed into each other and enfeebled conflict risk during the 
most sensitive critical junctures.26   
Accordingly, two leaders, ERWK =KHO\X =KHOHY DQG $KPHW 'R÷DQ played 
significantly facilitating UROHV WR PLWLJDWH WKH FRQIOLFW SRWHQWLDO )LUVW %XOJDULD¶V
democratically elected President Zhelyu Zhelev was an anti-communist with strong 
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OLEHUDO WHQGHQFLHV ,Q IDFW LQ WKH DIWHUPDWK RI %XOJDULD¶V WUDQVLWLRQ WR GHPRFUDF\ KH
treated the Turkish minority as an ally in consolidating democratic practices and ensuring 
%XOJDULD¶V LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWR WKH Euro-Atlantic structures.27 To this end, Zhelev actively 
supported the initiatives to secure the participation of the Turkish MPs in the Bulgarian 
Parliament, despite popular nationalist protests against the Turkish representatives in 
1990. Thanks to the political moderation and conciliatory politics advocated by Zhelev 
and his close aides, soon after the regime change, the Turkish minority established their 
own political party in March  XQGHU WKH OHDGHUVKLS RI $KPHW 'R÷DQ ZKLFK ZDV
named Movement for Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter, MRF - Hak ve Özgürlükler 
Hareketi in Turkish. The MRF became an active player in Bulgarian politics and was 
represented in the Bulgarian Parliament in all elections during the transition period 
(Eminov, 1999: 40; see table 1 below).  
Table 1. Election results in Bulgaria during transition period 
 1990 1991 1994 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
BSP 211 47.2 110 45.8 125 52.1 
UDF 144 36.2 106 44.2 69 28.8 
MRF 23 6.0 24 10.0 15 6.2 
BANU 16 8.0 -- -- -- -- 
PU -- -- -- -- 18 7.5 
BBB -- -- -- -- 13 5.4 
Others 6 -- -- -- -- -- 
Total 400 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 
Source: National Statistical Institute, Republic of Bulgaria. 
 
The establishment of MRF as a political party was by no means an easy task. The 
fourth paragraph of article 11(1) of the Bulgarian Constitution adopted on 12 July 1991 
states WKDW ³WKHUH VKDOO EH QR SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV RQ HWKQLF UDFLDO DQG UHOLJLRXV OLQHV«´28 
The Political Party Act also incorporated the same principle before the adoption of the 
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new Constitution. Bulgarian nationalists tried to ban MRF twice on the grounds that MRF 
was in breach of the Political Party Act and article 11(1) of the Constitution. The first 
attempt came just before the 1990 elections, in which MRF also aimed to take part. 
$FFRUGLQJO\6RILD&LW\&RXUWDQGWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWGHQLHG05)¶VDWWHPSWWRUHJLVWHU
as a political party prior to the 1990 elections. The Central Electoral Commission, 
however, granted permission to the party to register and attend the June 1990 elections 
(Nitzova, 1997: 729-739). The second attempt to ban the MRF, which was headed by 
Bulgarian Socialist Party members, materialized in late 1991 (Eminov, 1999). The 
Bulgarian deputies filed a petition at the Constitutional Court on the ground that MRF 
ZDV YLRODWLQJ DUWLFOH  RI %XOJDULDQ &RQVWLWXWLRQ ZKLFK SURKLELWV DFWLQJ WR ³WKH
GHWULPHQW RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG QDWLRQDO LQWHJULW\´ Thanks to the 
brinkmanship of Zhelyu Zhelev, the Constitutional Court rejected the application of 
nationalist deputies and decided that MRF could continue its existence as a political party 
(Kolarova, 1993: 23-51). According to Plamen Bogoev, legal counsel at Sofia City Court 
DQGWKHOHJDODGYLVRUWR3UHVLGHQW=KHOHY³WKHMXGJHPHQWRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWRQ
Constitutional Case #1/1991 was a definite contribution both to the democratic process in 
WKHFRXQWU\DQGWRWKHVXSUHPDF\RIODZ´%RJRHY7KH05)¶VIRrbearance 
and representation in the Bulgarian Parliament provided vital political opportunities for 
the Turkish minority to restore their religious and linguistic rights in addition to the 
political reclamations.  
The 1991 Constitution, approved by the Parliament in which MRF also took 
active part, was an important yardstick in this regard. Article 13 of the Constitution 
DVVHUWHGWKDW³WKHSUDFWLsing of any religion shall be free (2) the religious institutions 
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VKDOOEH VHSDUDWH IURP WKHVWDWH«´$UWLFOHPRUHRYHUDFNQRZOHGJHV WKH³VWDWH VKDOO
assist the maintenance of tolerance and respect among believers from different 
GHQRPLQDWLRQV«´ $FFRUGLQJO\ GXULQJ V WKH UHOLJLRXV VFKRROV ZHUH UHRSHQHG In 
DGGLWLRQ WKH PDVV SXEOLFDWLRQ RI WKH 4XU¶DQ LQ %Xlgarian and Turkish languages was 
legalized along with the right for Muslims to pray in mosques (Lewis, 1994: 20-29). The 
Turkish minority also improved their ethno-linguistic rights. The complex legal 
procedure was amended in 1991 thanks to the policies pursued by the MRF at the 
Bulgarian Parliament. After the legal amendments, the overwhelming majority of the 
people belonging to the Turkish minority filed petitions to the relevant state authorities to 
revert back to their Turkish names, as a result of which the number of applications 
UHDFKHGLQ0DUFK'D\ÕR÷OX7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQHQYLVLRQHG
certain rights for non-ethnic Bulgarian citizens to study in their native language as well. 
Accordingly, these minority groups were enabled to establish private schools (article 53) 
DQGUHFRJQL]HGWKHULJKWRIHYHU\FLWL]HQ³WRDYDLOKLPVHOIRIWKHQDWLRQDODQGXQLYHUVDO
cultural values and to develop his own culture in accordance with his ethnic self-
LGHQWLILFDWLRQ´ DUWLFOH  7KH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO FKDQJHV ZHUH VLJQLILFDQW LQ WHUPV RI WKH
socio-political conditions of Turkish minority in Bulgaria because they constituted a clear 
policy change toward the Turks in comparison to the repressive policies pursued by 
Zhivkov UHJLPH,QWKHZRUGVRI(PLQRY³DIWHUDKLDWXVRIPRUHWKDQ\HDUV7XUNLVK
FKLOGUHQ RQFH DJDLQ ZRXOG EH SURYLGHG LQVWUXFWLRQ LQ WKHLU PRWKHU WRQJXH´ (PLQRY
1999: 48).29  
In the early years of transition, thanks to Zhelyu Zhelev, the Bulgarian state 
pursued conciliatory policies regarding the minority issues. The integrationist strategy of 
 20 
the new Bulgarian elite proved effective in preventing die-hard nationalists from 
domLQDWLQJ WKH FRQIOLFW 6LPLODUO\ WKH 7XUNLVK PLQRULW\ OHDGHU $KPHG 'R÷DQ DOVR
demonstrated much-needed political entrepreneurship in averting possible violent 
FRQIOLFW(YHQGXULQJKLVWLPHLQSULVRQLQWKHV'R÷DQVHQWRUGHUVWRKLVIROORZHUV
not to UHVRUWWRYLROHQWWDFWLFV(PLQRY$KPHW'R÷DQDOVRDFWHGLQDGHFLVLYH
manner to put the MRF into a moderate track by marginalizing ultra-nationalist rhetoric 
within the party echelons.30 After the fall of the Zhivkov regime, through the MRF, 
DR÷DQVHFXUHGWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRI7XUNLVKPLQRULW\LQWRWKHJRYHUQDQFHRIWKHFRXQWU\
There was a delicate balance at that time and the role of MRF was quite important in 
terms of alleviating the inter-communal tension. In fact, the MRF never called for 
independence or autonomy for the Turks.31 The party leaders did not even push for the 
recognition of the 7XUNVDV³QDWLRQDOPLQRULW\´$V.UDVVLPLU.DQHYXQGHUOLQHG³7XUNV¶
demands were minimalist. They just asked for their basic rights and freedoms. They 
never asked IRUDXWRQRP\DQGRULQGHSHQGHQFH´32 The major policy of the MRF was to 
improve the rights of the Turks and their participation into the political, social, and 
economic life in the country as equal citizens along with ethnic Bulgarians.33 Tsvetan 
Tsvetanov, Bulgarian Minister of the Interior, acknowledged the role of MRF as follows: 
MRF has really helped to avoid any ethnic conflicts in the country. They have 
also participated; alongside with the all other political parties in the Bulgarian 
Parliament, in the preparations to join NATO and the EU and they have supported 
[the democratization] process like all other political parties.34 
 
A UHWURVSHFWLYH DQDO\VLV UHYHDOV WKDW ERWK =KHOHY DQG 'R÷DQ IRXQG D FRPPRQ
adversary, i.e. the ancien régime, to struggle against to materialize their particular 
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SROLFLHV $V 0LKDLO ,YDQRY 3UHVLGHQW =KHOHY¶V DGYLVHU DW WKH WLPH VWDWHG ³>GXULQJ WKH
transition period], the newly formed democratic opposition determined Communist 
regime as common enemy [in order to prevent an ethnic clash between Bulgarians and 
7XUNV@´35 7KH 7XUNLVK HOLWHV DOVR UHVRUWHG WR WKH VDPH LGHD )RU LQVWDQFH DV <DOÕPRY
FODLPV³GXULQJWUDQVLWLRQSHULRG&RPPXQLVP>DVWKHLGHRORJ\@ZDVGHFODUHGDVWKHPDLQ
culprit. This approach calmed people on both sides and avoided the emergence of an 
HWKQLF FRQIOLFW´ 36  The common adversary for both parties, once combined with the 
political entrepreneurship of both sides, brought double moderation that facilitated 
peaceful transformation and smooth integration of the Turkish minority into Bulgarian 
socio-political life that informed sustainable return of the displaced Turks. 
The complementary role of international actors 
The third set of factors relate to the enabling and complementary role of the international 
actors that further facilitated the voluntary return through invoking the cultural and 
minority rights of the Turks of Bulgaria. The most important facilitator, in this context, is 
found to be the EU anchor. The data suggest that the allure of the future EU membership 
played a significant, though complementary, role in moderating the nationalist backlash 
against minorities. In the broader Balkan and Eastern European region, the EU is one of 
the best examples often cited to underline the positive effects of globalization and 
regional integration based on democracy and the market economy (Vachudova, 2005). 
%XOJDULD¶VWUDQVLWLRQWRGHPRFUDF\LQWKHVDQGLWVHYHQWXDOHQWU\LQWRWKH(8LQ
positively informed the peaceful resolution of the identity-based conflicts as the 
conditions imposed by Brussels on Sofia for full membership helped to curb nationalist 
and discriminatory tendencies in Bulgarian politics. 37  Therefore, it appears that the 
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scrutiny by the EU institutions was serious, real, and continuous. A recent article of New 
York Times, for instance, also appraises Bulgaria as a country with stable inclusive 
institutions thanks to the EU oversight and guidance (Dzhambazova, 2017). 
7KH (8¶V UROH KRZHYHU HYROYHG RYHU WLPH ,Q WKH ILUVW SKDVH RI %XOJDULD¶V
transition to democracy, the EU played a rather complementary role in terms of restoring 
the rights of Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The macro-goal of returning to Europe 
provided a benchmark for the political elites of both majority and minority 
representatives. In the words of Baeva and Kalinova³WKH(8¶VUROHFDQEHGHWHFWHG LQ
WKHSUHVVXUHIRU>PLQRULW\ULJKWV@,WZDVHVSHFLDOO\WUXHGXULQJWKHVZKHQWKH(8¶V
SRVLWLRQ ZDV WKDW WKH 05)¶V SUHVHQFH LQ WKH 3DUOLDPHQW ZDV D QHFHVVDU\ FRQGLWLRQ for 
%XOJDULD WR SURFHHG ZLWK WKH QHJRWLDWLRQV´38 Furthermore, the displacement literature 
suggests that security provisions emerge as a crucial explanatory factor that boosts the 
success of voluntary return rates. 39  $FFRUGLQJO\ %XOJDULD¶V GHWHUPLQHG DWWHPSts to 
reform its governance structures along with the European rules and norms facilitated the 
re-integration of Turks into Bulgarian society since the EU was also conceived as a kind 
of guarantor and security provider. As Hakov succinctly points RXW³WKH 1989 events will 
QHYHUEHUHSHDWHGDJDLQDVORQJDV%XOJDULDUHPDLQVSDUWRIWKH(8´40 $KPHG'R÷DQIRU
instance, firmly believed that the rights of the Turkish minority would best be secured 
within the Euro-Atlantic structures.41 
The impact of the EU becaPH PRUH GLUHFW DQG XQHTXLYRFDO DIWHU %XOJDULD¶V
official candidacy in 1999, which can be described as a period of intense Europeanization 
LQ %XOJDULDQ SROLWLFV ,Q WKLV SHULRG WKH (8¶V WUDQVIRUPDWLYH SRZHU RYHU %XOJDULD
increased significantly due to the EU conditionality attached to membership prospects 
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3DSDGLPLWULRX DQG *DWHYD   3KLQQHPRUH   6LQFH %XOJDULD¶V JRDO
was to become an EU member state, Bulgarian policy-makers intensified their attempts to 
adopt the EU acquis. In terms of minority rights and the state of Turkish minority, 
significant improvements took place during this period. First, the Bulgarian Parliament 
ratified the Framework Convention in May 1999. The ratification process was painful 
because the nationalist groups appealed to Constitutional Court to contest the term 
µQDWLRQDOPLQRULWLHV¶7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWKDYLQJWDNHQ%XOJDULD¶VFDQGLGDF\VWDWXV
into consideration, rejected the application and the Framework Convention was 
implemented.42 Second, the Race Equality Directive (Council Directive 2000/43) was 
adopted as part of EU acquis LQ  WR ³OD\ GRZQ D IUDPHZRUN IRU FRPEDWLQJ
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with a view to putting into effect 
LQ WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV WKH SULQFLSOH RI HTXDO WUHDWPHQW´ DUWLFOH  43  The Directive 
prohibits direct and indirect discrimination in employment, the labour market, social 
protection, education, and access to public goods. The European Commission, in its 
regular progress reports, requested Bulgaria to comply with the Race Equality Directive 
(EC, 2004: 25-26). The Directive was quite important for the Turkish minority because 
they suffered from the implicit discrimination in their attempts to participate in economic 
and political life in Bulgaria.44  
As several researchers highlight, one should not underestimate at this point that 
VXEVWDQWLDOFKDOOHQJHVSHUVLVWFRQFHUQLQJ%XOJDULD¶VRYHUDOOGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQSHUIRUPDQFH
(Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008). The performance of Bulgarian governments during the 
SURWUDFWHG(XURSHDQL]DWLRQSURFHVVDQGWKH%XOJDULDQSXEOLF¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGs Turkish 
minority suggest that internalization of European norms still remains a work in progress. 
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On that note, public surveys do not imply a cognitive shift as the evidence suggests that 
an overwhelming majority of Bulgarians still perceive Turkish minoULW\ DV D µWKUHDW¶
rather than appreciating multiculturalism. The public surveys conducted by Krassimir 
Kanev and his team are illuminating in this regard (Kanev, 2007: 79-88). Accordingly, 69 
SHUFHQWRI%XOJDULDQFLWL]HQVSHUFHLYH7XUNVDV³UHOLJLRXVIDQDWLFV´DQGSHUFHQWagree 
with the statement ³7XUNV KDYH RFFXSLHG WRR PDQ\ SRVLWLRQV LQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW´ 7KH
daily social interactions between Turkish minority and ethnic Bulgarians also encounter 
difficulties. The available data hint that the inter-communal relations between the Turks 
and ethnic Bulgarians are overshadowed by historical prejudices and doubts. The rights 
that Turks gained during the democratization process seem to disturb the Bulgarian 
majority as it becomes apparent by the rise of xenophobic ATAKA party. On the other 
hand, the data suggests that despite the fact that Turkish minority appears to be satisfied 
with the official apology of the Bulgarian state, trust problems still prevail beneath the 
surface as none of the perpetrators have been brought to the courts and sentenced for their 
FULPHV GXULQJ WKH ³national UHYLYDO SURFHVV´45 Despite all these obstacles, in the final 
analysis, it is nevertheless possible to maintain that the Europeanization of the Bulgarian 
minority rights regime informed better integration of the Turkish minority into Bulgarian 
society, which created conducive macro-environment for the returnee Turks to sustain 
their order in the country (Rechel, 2007; 2008: 175). It appears, however, that the EU 
factor emerged as a complementary rather than a constitutive element in the transition 
years that further motivated the voluntary and sustainable return of the forcibly migrated 
Turks. 
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LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The research findings, while shedding light on an under researched case in 
displacement literature, also have certain limitations. First, the interview data analysed in 
this article should be complemented and checked with other research techniques to 
replicate and triangulate the findings. The research inferences should be checked with 
new interviewers and through different interviewee samples as the data in this study 
gathered by one interviewer. Though it is a common practice in political science to 
conduct qualitative research with one interviewer, it would be useful to check the 
findings with more interviewers to increase the reliability of inferences. In addition, 
large-n survey data compiled from the Turks of Bulgaria would shed fresh light, 
especially on the micro-dynamics of voluntary return. Large-n surveys would not only 
enable gathering systematic data at the non-elite level due to the larger sample size but 
also provide opportunities to mitigate the potential impacts of varying degrees of 
cultural/linguistic mismatch between the interviewer and interviewees. Second, the 
grounded macro-level framework proposed in this article should also be tested in other 
forced migration cases to reveal the causal mechanisms and inner workings in a 
comparative perspective. In conclusion, however, it is the premise of this research that, 
by studying Bulgaria as a crucial case, the present research makes conceptual and 
empirical contributions to the relevant body of literature on inter-ethnic conflicts and 
voluntary return of forcibly displaced people. 
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CONCLUSION 
Almost 40 per cent of Turks that were subjected to forced migration in late 1980s, 
voluntarily returned to Bulgaria, despite earlier harsh assimilation policies and massive 
human suffering. This is quite a striking case that deserves close analysis as it poses a 
counter-example to the mainstream democratization theories in the literature predicting 
conflict. The studies of Mann, Brubaker, and Mansfield and Snyder, for instance, predict 
the escalation of inter-ethnic conflict as one likely, but presumably unintended, outcomes 
of democratization. The Bulgarian case, however, tells a different story, which makes it 
an outlier in the literature. Drawing on forty-six semi-structured interviews, this article 
offered a grounded conceptual framework extrapolating three main context-specific 
macro-level factors that facilitated peaceful voluntary return of the forcibly displaced 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria.  
First, the assimilation campaign towards the Turks did not lead to a violent 
conflict between parties. While neighbouring Yugoslavia was torn apart by deadly 
violence, Bulgaria remained relatively peaceful ³GHVSLWHVLPLODUUHOLJLRXVGLYLGHVVHYHUH
economic hardships, and massive social and political changes that followed the arrival of 
GHPRFUDF\DQGIUHHPDUNHWV´(Ghodsee, 2009: 12). Even substantial problems related to 
%XOJDULD¶VGHPRFUDWL]ation performance still persist; the peaceful transition to democracy 
opened a window of opportunity for the Turks to be represented in the governing 
institutions of the country. The establishment of the MRF as the political party of Turkish 
minority provided a legitimate platform to raise their demands and concerns. Second, 
double moderation of the majority and minority groups in Bulgaria facilitated voluntary 
return in the post-Communist era. In this sense, one should give credit to Zhelyu Zhelev 
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and $KPHW 'R÷DQ as political entrepreneurs and WKH DUFKLWHFWV RI µGRXEOH PRGHUDWLRQ¶
since both leaders acted in a way that enfeebled conflict potential and underpinned inter-
communal reconciliation. Finally, external factors, particularly the EU, played a rather 
complementary function by expanding and guaranteeing minority rights in Bulgaria and 
encouraging their inclusion to the Bulgarian social-political system, and evoking the 
economic, political and cultural rights to the minority groups. 
 
NOTES 
                                                        
1
 For a discussion on voluntary and forced migration, see: Yarris and Castaneda (2015). 
2
 Todor Jivkov explicitly mentions in his speech while addressing BCP Politburo members and BCP 
&HQWUDO&RPPLWWHHPHPEHUVRQ-DQXDU\E\VD\LQJWKDW³:HDUHLQWKLVVLWXDWLRQVLQFH
September. Turks are located in the very important border regions. Think Kardzhali for example, this 
region is mostly populated by Turks. Kardzhali region is the heart of South and key to the entire Rodopi 
region. We recently realised that if there is a potential war, Turks are already holding the strategic points. 
Today, ZHVKRXOGWDNHWKHDGYDQWDJHRI7XUNH\¶VFXUUHQWFRQIOLFWZLWK*UHHFHDQGLPSOHPHQWRXUDFWLRQ
SODQRIIHUHGE\*HRUJL$WDVDQRY´*HRUJL$WDVDQRYLVWKHWKHQ3ULPH0LQLVWHURI%XOJDULDQ
3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF$WWKHHQGRIKLVVSHHFK-LYNRYUHIHUVWR.ardzhali region as being the fortress of 
Turkish people. For the original Bulgarian version, see, 'ÕUMDYQD$JHQWVL\D³$UKLYL´-219); for 
Turkish version, see, Mevsim (2013: 9-10).  
3
 There is a voluminous literature on different aspects of forced migration and displacement. For a 
comprehensive survey on the literature, see Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh at. al. (2014). Among others, national 
development objectives, which were also the case in the Soviet Bulgaria, is also one of the motivations of 
internal displacement and forced migration practices. For a discussion on development-created population 
displacement, especially in the Soviet sphere, see McDowell (2014).   
4
 For a literature review and theory-informed discussion on the issue, see, Stefanovic and Loizides (2011). 
For an exception of the Bulgarian case, see, Parla (2006). 
5
 $VWKHDXWKRUVH[WHQVLYHO\GLVFXVVWKURXJK³PXOWLSOHVRFLDOLGHQWLWLHV´FRQFHSWWKHXVDJHRI7XUNLVK-
%XOJDULDQVRU³%XOJDULDQ7XUNV´DUHVWLOOQRWDFFHSWDEOHDPRQJWKH7XUNV of Bulgaria as it implies a 
misperception that leads to a wrong implication of them belonging to Bulgarian ethnicity, as this is exactly 
what was imposed in the 1980s showing itself, for instance, enforcing Bulgarian names.  
6
 I followed the same sampling procedures for all samples that are selected through of purposive sampling 
method.  
7
 In this category I interviewed with eight families living in northern (Isperih, Shumen, Razgrad) and 
southern (Delchevo, Krumovgrad, Ardino) provinces of Bulgaria and in Sofia, the capital city. The 
interview sample with the families represents geographical diversity of the Turkish minority living in 
Bulgaria. In each region, the interviewees are selected through snowballing sampling technique. 
8
 See note 7. 
9
 I am fluent in Turkish and English. The two of the interviews are conducted in Bulgarian with the help of 
an interpretive native in Turkish and Bulgarian. There was no indication that my presence as an out-group 
member had an influence on the interviews. Since the research question deals with an historical issue, the 
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risk of social desirability bias is considered low. Nevertheless, the commonly used procedures are applied 
to mitigate social desirability bias. Accordingly, the interview questions were articulated in a neutral 
manner, indirect questioning was used, and utmost attention was paid to avoid favouring any particular 
viewpoint (for details, see Byrne, 2004: 182; Aberbach and Rockman, 2002).      
10
 I applied triangulation technique to check and verify the data provided by the respondents. The data 
gathered through interviews are compared with archival materials on the subject matter, the secondary 
literature, and with the answers of other respondents where applicable. For the use of triangulation 
technique and its importance for qualitative research in political science, see George and Bennett (2005). 
11
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http://www.parliament.bg/bg/18 (accessed on 12 May 2016).  
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14
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DUHVWLOOXQFOHDU7KHVHQXPEHUVDUHEDVHGRQDXWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK0HKPHW1L\D]L7KH6HFUHWDU\
General of BAHAD - the Association of Justice, Rights, Culture and Solidarity of Belene Camp Victims, 
March 28, 2015.  
15
 After painful years in Belene Camp, these people were conditionally released in the spring of 1987 and 
internally displaced to the districts entirely populated by Bulgarians. For an extensive and biographical 
documentation regarding the memories of victims, see, Mevsim and Kutlay (2013). 
16
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWKøEUDKLP<DOÕPRY3URIHVVRUthen Rector of Sofia High Institute of Islam, April 
27, 2010. 
17
 State Archive Agency Bulgaria published the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo Archives on 
³1DWLRQDO5HYLYDO3URFHVV´LQWZRYROXPHVVHH'ÕUMDYQD$JHQWVL\D³$UKLYL´ 
18
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWKø<DOÕPRY 
19
 7RGRU-LYNRY¶VVSHHFKRQWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIQDPH-changing policy in a meeting with the participation 
of BCP Politburo members, BCP Central Commitee members and BCP local government representatives 
on 18 January 1985. For the original Bulgarian version, see, 'ÕUMDYQD$JHQWVL\D³$UKLYL´-219); 
for Turkish version, see, Mevsim (2013: 9-10). 
20
 )RUWKHIXOOWH[WRI=KLYNRY¶VVSHHFKLQ7XUNLVKVHH0HYVLP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-27). For the original Bulgarian 
YHUVLRQVHH'ÕUMDYQD$JHQWVL\D³$UKLYL´-519). 
21
 $XWKRU¶Vfield notes during her visits to the families who were subjected to forced migration of 1989, 
October 22-25, 2011, Bursa/Turkey; January 12-22, 2012, Kardzhali/Bulgaria.   
22
 For an autobiographic history of the transformation period in Bulgaria, see, Zhelev (2008). 
23
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK&HQJL]+DNRY3URIHVVRU%XOJDULDQ$FDGHP\RIScience, Institute for Balkan 
Studies, May 4, 2010. 
24
 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWKD%XOJDULDQSROLWLFDODQDO\VW0D\$XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK0LKDLO
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Bulgarian Academy of Science, Institute for Balkans Studies, May 9, 2010. 
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 $XWKRU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK=KHO\X=KHOHYILUVWGHPRFUDWLFDOO\-elected President of Bulgaria, May 21, 2010. 
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 The Constitution of Bulgaria, 1991. Available online at: http://www.parliament.bg/en/const (accessed on 
20 June 2016).  
29
 The changes on article, however, did not mean automatic spill over in practice. The nationalist segments 
of Bulgarian political parties pushed hard to postpone the implementation of these rights especially during 
BSP governments. For example, in December 1994, after the rise of BSP as the governing party, Ilcho 
Dimitrov was appointed as the Minister of Education. Dimitrov was one of the staunch supporters of 
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sentiments to the areas where Turkish minority was composing the overwhelming majority of the 
population. These officials¶PDLQ duties were to change the curricula of Turkish classes and disrupt the 
appropriate implementations of the linguistic rights at the schools. After being appointed as MoE, Dimitrov 
played a key role in making Turkish classes optional before and after the normal school hours even in the 
villages where Turkish minority was overwhelming. Since Turkish classes were not compulsory anymore, 
it significantly decreased the number of children attending the classes. The broadcasting in Turkish 
language was another contentious issue. Although the 1991 constitution enabled the Turkish minority to 
broadcast in their native language, the actual means of conducting this right was not provided till 2000s. 
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 
36
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Rumelili (2007). 
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 For an elaborative account, see, Stefanovic, Loizides and Parsons (2014). 
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43
 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
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